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Abstract In this article, I will investigate to what extent democracy and the Rule of
Law require that ISPs as ‘common carriers’ that provide ‘mere conduit’ pre-empt
extensive monitoring of the content they carry. I will trace this duty as a moral duty
that is bound up with the framework of constitutional democracy, arguing that such
monitoring affords unprecedented data-mining operations that could stifle our
account of ourselves as moral agents in the novel infosphere.
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1 Introduction
We can observe the proliferation of what is called ‘big data’ everywhere. From
the life sciences to physics and astronomy to criminology, forensics, insurance,
the protection of critical infrastructure to marketing and advertising, massive
amounts of data are captured, stored and aggregated. This only makes sense (and
money, obviously) to the extent that we have the techniques to squeeze meaning
out of these numbers. De-contextualized as they are, these data require re-
contextualization to make them work for us. And their number implies that this
can only be achieved by means of data-mining technologies with enormous
Philos. Technol. (2011) 24:371–390
DOI 10.1007/s13347-011-0041-8
M. Hildebrandt
Institute of Computer and Information Sciences (ICIS), Radboud University Nijmegen,
Nijmegen, the Netherlands
M. Hildebrandt
Law Science Technology and Society (LSTS), Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, Belgium
M. Hildebrandt (*)
Department of Jurisprudence, Erasmus School of Law, Rotterdam, Netherlands
e-mail: hildebrandt@frg.eur.nl
computing power, way beyond the scope of the human mind. Finding patterns in
databases is commonly called Knowledge Discovery in Databases (KDD),
alluding to novel ways of abducting knowledge from aggregated machine-
readable data. Suggesting that these computational patterns constitute knowledge
implies a novel epistemology.
In this contribution, I will trace the ethical and legal consequences of this
novel engagement with knowledge production, focusing on the position of
Internet Service Providers (ISPs). What interests me here is the question to what
extent ISPs should provide built-in protection against extensive monitoring of
Internet conduct. In other work, we have coined the articulation of legal
protection into the ICT infrastructure as Ambient Law (Hildebrandt and Koops
2010). Instead of inquiring whether ISPs have a moral duty to monitor content in
order to fight child pornography, human trafficking, money laundering or other
criminal actions, I will raise the opposite issue of whether we have a moral duty to
impose a legal duty on ISPs to prevent systematic interception, storage,
aggregation and analysis of data that pass through their infrastructure. I will not
argue for a moral duty for individual ISPs, based on a utilitarian or deontological
framework of moral philosophy, but for a requirement to build in such protection
based on the framework of constitutional democracy. The moral duty that informs
this requirement hinges on two interrelated moral values, namely privacy and
transparency. The first is related to negative and positive freedom in the
development of personal identity; the second relates to the transparency of those
in authority (and those in power). Both depend on and constitute the framework of
constitutional democracy: they are public goods that celebrate a relative and
relational individual autonomy as something that is not given, cannot be taken for
granted and requires a specific system of checks and balances.
I will start with a reflection on Floridi’s notion of ‘re-ontologizing of the
infosphere’, to capture the enormity of the transformations that are taking place
in our information and communication infrastructures. Next, I will trace the
epistemological implications of this re-ontologization, focusing on the advance of
big number crunching or knowledge discovery in databases, ending with a
discussion of the ‘inference problem’. This problem concerns the fact that the
emerging infosphere seems capable of anticipating our behaviours, before we
become aware of them. This raises a number of ethical issues about the extent to
which we are being ‘read’ since such inferences could dissolve the ‘ontological
friction’ that safeguards our privacy. Finally, I will discuss the role of ISPs as
caretakers of the most extensive amount of data that can be mined and used to
profile us. So far, most privacy activists have focused on the Big Data stored by
commercial giants like Google or governmental agencies that require personal
data to e.g. redistribute welfare or claim taxes. However, recently it has become
technically feasible for ISPs to inspect the data they ‘carry’ in a systematic
manner, enabling them to become involved in a number of schemes to make
business out of data. This article will argue that constitutional democracy
requires us to build effective and legitimate fences into the bottom line of the
infrastructure that is under the care of the ISPs. This will be the only reliable
way to prevent individual citizens from becoming singularly transparent to
anybody who can afford to pay for these inferences.
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2 Re-ontologizing of the Infosphere: Umwelt, Welt and What?
To develop an understanding of the role of ISPs in our socio-technical landscape, I
think that Floridi’s notion of a re-ontologization of the infosphere is on the spot
(Floridi 2005). Before developing an ethics of number crunching and deriving a
legal obligation for ISPs to prevent unlicensed profiling, we need to frame the
transformation of our ICT infrastructure.
Floridi’s main point is that the ongoing informatization of human society has not
merely augmented or enhanced our agency but has radically changed the ontological
structure of the infosphere. This implies that both our selves and our environment are
in a process of radical alteration. Though he does not cite Negroponte’s shift from
atoms to bits (Negroponte 1996), he describes the radical changes in terms of a
‘migration of humanity from its Umwelt to the infosphere itself’ (Floridi 2010: 189).
He describes this in function of a thorough digitization of information that amounts
to a digitization of information entities that results in a homogenization of the
processor and the processed. In turn, this constitutes the informationalization of
interactions between different agents and the evolution of new informational agents
(both artificial and hybrid).
Though I agree that we are in a state of radical transition of both ourselves and
our environment, it is not clear how we should understand the move from an Umwelt
to ‘the infosphere itself’. Opposing the concept of infosphere to that of Umwelt
suggests a move from the material to the mental or at least to the disembodied. In
other work, Turilli and Floridi (2009: 108) have emphasized that information must
not be confused with data:
A datum is something that ‘makes a difference’ and, as such, can be perceived,
measured and captured via an interaction. (…) Information is produced
through the elaboration of data. Semantic information can be thought of as the
result of a set of operations performed by an agent taking raw data as input and
producing well-formed, meaningful and truthful data (that is, information) as
output (…). Semantic information is not the result of a ‘snapshot’ or passive
observation, but depends on agents’ proactive meaningful data elaborations
(semanticisation)’.
Information, understood in this way, is a crucial sign of embodied agency. It
indicates an entity capable of distinguishing the ‘difference that makes a
difference’ (Bateson 1972). This is inherent in the concept of Umwelt, since this
necessarily assumes an agent that fits its affordances (Gibson 1986). As such, an
Umwelt assumes embodied informational entities capable of interacting on the
basis of relevant data that are spotted and translated into what is ‘actionable’ for the
agent (Varela et al. 1991). I would think that an Umwelt is an infosphere and to the
extent that a human observer can speak in a meaningful way about the infosphere,
this infosphere is an Umwelt for whichever agents are interacting, practicing their
autonomy and adapting to relevant changes. Going online, entering cyberspace,
playing around in virtual worlds or hanging out in ‘the cloud’ does not imply
disembodiment. It does, of course, imply a translation of one’s interactions into
machine-readable discrete data, but I would argue that this is a re-embodiment
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rather than a disembodiment (Ihde 2002). It is also—to some extent—a
homogenization that allows processor and processed to interact seamlessly, but
the discipline of human–machine-interfacing confirms that this requires a lot of
added energy and complexity to ‘work’. Humans, dogs, plants and machines are
embodied differently and this has consequences for the manner in which they
constitute and participate in the infospheres (= Umwelts) that afford their
interaction. I am using the plural here to highlight the fact that there is not one
infosphere, despite the fact that the World-Wide Web seems to suggest an
overarching global online infosphere. What makes this seemingly unified
homogenized infosphere interesting is the ongoing de- and re-contextualization
of digital data that it affords (Kallinikos 2006), thus indeed constituting a plurality
of permanently reconstituted online Umwelts.
Instead of moving straight from Umwelt to infosphere, we may deepen our
understanding by introducing the concept of Welt, defined as the semantic
universe that builds on spoken and written human language. Ricoeur (1973) has
explained how text allows us to distinguish between an ostensive reference
(always dependent on the Umwelt) and the non-ostensive reference that depends
on symbolic language (thus creating a Welt). He saliently highlights how precisely
the materiality of written text affords the creation of a con-text beyond one’s
Umwelt, even allowing for a measure of de- and re-contextualisation that is only
possible when a text is read in a radically different context (in a different time and/
or place). Ong (1982); Eisenstein (2005); Goody and Watt (1963); Ihde (1990) and
many others have traced the material affordances of the script and the printing
press as preconditional for the kind of world we now inhabit, thus calling attention
to the fact that moving from an actual situation to its context to more abstract
thought depends on the embodiment of human speech by means of stone
engravings, clay inscriptions, paper writings and finally the movable type printing
press. Higher levels of abstraction thus depend on the advent and proliferation of
text. Taking this into account we can understand the re-ontologization of the
infosphere as a move from the Welts of modern times to an infosphere that allows
for a higher level of abstraction. I would not qualify this as ‘the infosphere itself’
since this could refer to the homogenization of an infosphere without interfaces,
beyond the need to translate, enabling seamless interaction. Such homogenization
would take us beyond any ontological friction, seemingly ruling out any
obstruction that stands between us and ever more salient and more relevant
information. Though the description of the re-ontologized infosphere could invite
such an idealistic but unseemly interpretation, this cannot be Floridi’s own. Below
I will discuss his concept of privacy as an ‘ontological friction’ that safeguards a
person’s autonomy in terms of informational self-constitution, as well as several
warnings against the threat of a unified language or indiscriminate transparency.
The question remains how the migration from Umwelt to Welt continues in the age
of ubiquitous computing, taking note of the fact that the emergence of a Welt has
not replaced our situatedness in an Umwelt but rather extended and multiplied our
situatedness.
In the next section, I will discuss the epistemological implications of big number
crunching or knowledge discovery in databases as the most salient transformation of
the socio-technical landscape.
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3 Epistemological Implications of Knowledge Discovery in Databases
3.1 Mediated Perception and Narrative Cognition
Floridi (2010: 255) suggests that ‘we are, to the best of our knowledge, the only
semantically structuring structures in the infosphere’.
As such, we give and make sense of what we experience by objectifying it.
The distance from the world that makes a rich cognitive life possible is also the
price imposed by the reification of the world.
This dovetails with the position of the human observer—already mentioned
above—as preconditional for the attribution of meaning, which is made possible
by the introduction of human language and its externalization and objectification
in the script. It confirms Ricoeur’s description of the emergence of a Welt in the
face of the distantiation (cf. Geisler 1985) that is inherent in human language and
its sedimentation in the script. It clarifies how the concept of an infosphere and
notions such as moral agency and moral patients depend on a third person
perspective that allows us to talk about things, others and our selves, allowing us to
not only reach high levels of abstraction but to also tell stories about blame and
responsibility. Blaming another or calling another to account (Butler 2005) implies
a distantiation, a view from elsewhere, an eye for what could have been different. It
disrupts the immediacy of a conscious awareness that is not also conscious of its
own consciousness (Plessner 1975; Cheung 2006), setting ‘us’ apart from a number
of other moral agents—thus actually creating the possibility of describing other
information entities as moral patients or moral agents. The distantiation promotes a
perception mediated by language and a narrative cognition.
Ricoeur (1992) has linked this distantiation to our narrative self-identity. Our
need to tell stories about the events in our lives that make a difference is typical for
our way of knowing both the world and our selves. There is a subtle tension
between ambiguity and certainty in a story; it challenges us to imagine other
courses of action but it also returns us to the legitimate expectations that constrain
our actions. This tension seems to be constitutive for our personal identity,
challenging us to reinvent both our selves and the world while still sustaining
continuity with former ‘selves’ and the webs of meaning that create common
ground with our fellows. One might be tempted to speak of a balance instead of a
tension but this assumes too much; the struggle between disruptive reinvention and
submissive continuity requires a persistent effort, and its outcome cannot be taken
for granted.
The question I want to raise is how data-mining operations on a grand scale—
i.e. super crunching (Ayres 2007)—will impact our mediated perception and
narrative cognition. What does it mean that ‘knowledge’ is mined from massive
amounts of data? If the distantiation inherent in human language affords the
contestation of knowledge claims, how will knowledge that is achieved by means
of data science (KDD, machine learning, neural nets or multi-agent systems) afford
its own scrutiny? Is a similar critical distantiation inherent in the statistical
calculations made possible by a computing power that is not available to the human
mind?
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3.2 Number Crunching: KDD
KDD is a process of inferring or abducting knowledge from aggregated data. It is
also called pattern recognition, because it detects patterns between data in a
database. It depends on five subsequent steps that are reiterative, thus creating a
permanent feed-back and allowing a persistent fine-tuning of the patterns found. The
first step concerns translating the flux of real-time events into discrete machine-
readable data. There is an element of objectification and reification here,
highlighting our inability to make sense of the world in flux. As Floridi (2010:
255) mentions when discussing our need for semantic structuring:
We freeze changes into state- or phase-transitions and modular events and
transform patterns and structures into objects and properties, finally privileging
a naive ontology of sufficiently permanent things and qualities.
However, this step is not made by us. It is implemented by computing systems,
translating events into bits that are without meaning until they are translated again
into stuff we can ‘read’. The second step consists of the aggregation of the data,
making it possible to ‘mine’ them in search of relevant patterns. This is done during
the third step, which is data analysis or data mining (Fayyad et al. 1996), using
algorithms, heuristics, neural nets or other computational techniques to find clusters,
association rules of other correlations between the data. When speaking of KDD, we
must take into account that the amount of data that can be ‘mined’ this way is
incredibly high: Ayres (2007: 11) speaks of datasets ‘measured not in mega- or
gigabytes but in tera- and even petabytes (1,000 terabytes)’. To detect patterns in
such datasets is not possible for the naked human eye. Especially when using
unsupervised learning techniques or bottom-up algorithms the patterns found are not
so much the confirmation of a correlation that was first hypothesized. These patterns
are novel hypothesis, ‘discovered’ by the computational techniques used to find
structures in the dataset. This is why the subtitle of Ayres book on Super Crunching
is: why thinking-by-numbers is the new way to be smart. Anderson (2008) actually
speaks of ‘The End of Theory’, announcing that this type of knowledge construction
will make ‘the Scientific Method obsolete’. Though such exuberant enthusiasm can
easily be criticized for being naive and even dangerous, I think we cannot deny that
data mining provides a new type of knowledge, requiring a novel epistemology.
The fourth step is that of interpretation: what do these correlations mean. Do they
imply causality and if so, in which direction? Might they be spurious, depending on
other factors not yet mined or interwoven in more complex ways with factors not
taken into consideration? In the case of behavioural data, one can ask whether the
patterns indicate unconscious motivations, particular emotions, deliberate choices,
socio-economic determinations, geographic or demographic influences, every time
raising questions about our assumptions regarding cognition and perception. For
instance, affective computing claims to ‘map’ our emotional states in relation to a
number of factors, recasting our sense of being in control of our selves (Picard
1997). Brain scans are correlated with thoughts and emotions, according to some
researchers potentially revealing our innermost life (Kamitani and Tong 2005). What
interests me here is that the findings of data-mining operations require interpretation
since just like in the case of text these transcriptions do not speak for themselves. We
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must learn to ‘read’ them, and before all, we must learn to accept that they cannot be
without bias, thus requiring a new critical stance capable of providing alternative
interpretation of the same patterns as well as alternative computing techniques to
mine the same dataset (Sculley and Pasanek 2008). What should worry us here is
that further automation, as envisioned in e.g. autonomic computing, will remove this
step. The narrative of autonomic computing is that the complexity of interacting
computer networks will be such that no amount of human programmers can find all
the bugs, repair system break-downs or sit down to interpret the results of real-time
data-mining operations. This implies that the interpretation will be performed by the
machines.
The fifth step concerns the application of the knowledge that was mined.
Interestingly, this application can be used to check whether the ‘knowledge’ fits the
new data; it allows modulating or even rejecting the inferred correlations. Within the
context of science (brain imaging, human genetics) this will allow for more accurate
models of explanation, within the context of security and commerce it should allow
for more accurate measurements of the effectiveness of specific safety regulations or
advertising strategies. In fact, the fifth step is entirely geared to fine-tune the
consequences of targeted interventions. If certain Web-surf behaviour can be
correlated with specific buying behaviour, this will allow businesses to personalize
their service. Note that, behavioural advertising is probably the forerunner of more
widespread targeted servicing that could eventually lead to smart environments like
Ambient Intelligence and the Internet of Things, which are supposed to proactively
cater to its users’ inferred preferences (Van den Berg 2010).
3.3 The Inference Problem
To the extent that smart infrastructures base their engagement with users on inferred
preferences, we encounter a novel problem, which Dwyer (2009) has saliently
coined as ‘the inference problem of pervasive computing’. It relates to the fact that in
the narrative of proactive computing, the networked environment is always one step
ahead of us because it is continuously ‘reading’ us. In my opinion, this is the most
far-reaching implication (affordance) of the re-ontologization of the infosphere.
Whereas, we have been used to things that do not anticipate our behaviours and to
people whose anticipations we can guess to some extent, we are not at all
accustomed to networked things that anticipate us without us having a clue as to how
we are being anticipated. This relates to the problem of ‘double contingency’ put
forward by Parsons’ and Luhmann: I can only act if I can anticipate how you will
interpret my action, and the same goes for you (Vanderstraeten 2007). This either
leads to the deadlock of a vicious circle, or creates the ambiguity and the openness of
human society. One way to solve the problem is to take ‘the intentional stance’
towards others, assuming that they will act on reasons that we can follow thus
allowing us to anticipate them and vice versa (Dennett 2009). The problem is that we
may find it difficult to attribute reasons and meaning to the actions of the smart
environment, either because we follow Searle’s Chinese Room argument (Searle
1980) and believe that machines cannot (yet) produce meaning or because we have
no access to the sense that machines make of our behaviours. As to the first, this
touches upon the epistemological implications of the novel knowledge production:
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how can we perceive and cognize how we are being read? What would it mean if we
take an intentional stance towards the smart environment even if we agree with
Searle that the Smart Room does not ‘understand’ us the way we expect another
person to understand us? As to the second, this connects with the fact that much of
the knowledge we are talking about is proprietary or secret for security reasons;
either hidden as a trade secret or as an intellectual property, or confidential because it
is used to predict criminal behaviour (Harcourt 2007).
The most important point to be made here is that the re-ontologization that comes
from the capture, storage, aggregation and analysis of ‘big data’ is not so much
about our personal data proliferating ‘everware’ (Greenfield 2006). It is about the
fact that some of our trivial data can be matched against knowledge that we are not
aware of. The concept of personal data is not very relevant here: first, because any
seemingly trivial data may become personal data once it is correlated with some
profile at some point in the future (Hildebrandt 2008b), and second, because it is not
our personal data that will make the difference but the knowledge mined from huge
datasets. These datasets are composed of personal and other data from a massive
amount of others, and these data may even be anonymized before mining them. The
consequences of the data deluge do not relate to personal data but to inferred
knowledge claims. Rouvroy (2011) and Rouvroy and Berns (2010) have described
what Floridi may term the re-ontologization of the infosphere as a ‘statistical
governance of the real’. The landscape that will surround us in the case of ubiquitous
proactive computing will consist of networked artefacts that change their behaviour
on the basis of a hidden complexity of continuous monitoring and real-time
computations, meaning that we are being ‘read’ by way of statistics. At the same
time, this landscape will be adapting itself based on the same real-time statistical
calculus. This implies an unprecedented subliminal reconfiguration; instead of
regulating our lives on the basis of written (legal) rules that we can see and contest,
this infrastructure would regulate our life world implicitly. As it were from under the
skin, below the threshold of consciousness (Hildebrandt 2011).
4 Some Ethicial Implications of the Novel Epistemology
4.1 Re-ontologizing Privacy: Are We Being Read?
I am not sure whether it makes sense to speak of re-ontologizing privacy, because it
might confuse those who think of an ontology as something that concerns what is
given as a substance. Building on Floridi’s own discussion of our need for ‘a naive
ontology of sufficiently permanent things and qualities’ (Floridi 2010, see above) I
would, however, suggest that re-ontologizing of the infosphere demands a re-
ontologization of privacy. Compared with e.g. re-thinking privacy speaking of a re-
ontologization acknowledges that privacy requires integration into the informational
infrastructure of our Umwelt, Welt and infosphere. In the end, we want the substance
of privacy, not merely the idea. This dovetails with the observation that privacy is an
affordance of the ICT infrastructure of the printing press, as Stalder and others
(Hildebrandt and Koops 2010; Stalder 2002; Hildebrandt 2008a) have suggested,
whereas it is unclear whether privacy will also be an affordance of the emerging
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smart infrastructure that builds on real-time pervasive monitoring and proactive
subliminal interventions.
Nevertheless, in order to re-ontologize privacy as an affordance of the novel
infosphere we need to re-think what privacy means in the era of Ambient
Intelligence and other types of smart environments. The most salient novelty of
such environments is their capacity to infer our future behaviours and their
capacity to act on these inferences without disturbing us with boring requests for
confirmation or consent. The point is not that the relevant software ‘has our
data’, but that the networked infrastructure will ‘read’ us. Whether they read us
right or wrong is not even the point, because—paraphrasing Merton—‘if
machines defines a situation as real, it is real in its consequences’. In the
previous infosphere, we had two defences against being read by others: first, we
could anticipate the way we would be read and adapt our behaviour; second, we
could seek ways to shield ourselves from being read.
The first defence is perhaps hardly a matter of privacy. It engages our positive
freedom to act, which depends on the double contingency mentioned above. Only if
we have a clue as to how our actions will be interpreted, can we reach out and
perform an action. Guessing how others will read us is mainly an intuitive, implicit
process that ‘runs’ in the background, allowing us a smooth interaction. Making
these intuitions explicit, however, will allow us to contest and resist them, choosing a
course of action that goes against the grain of what is expected. The introduction of
the script, which forces us to pay conscious attention to what we ‘read’, has at some
point triggered the introduction of written law, which thus in the end ‘affords’ its own
contestation. This is called the paradox of the Rechtsstaat or the advance of the Rule
of Law as compared with the Rule by Law; it is a historical artefact made possible by
the ICT infrastructure of the printing press (Hildebrandt 2008a). The problem of
smart ubiquitous pervasive proactive environments is that we do not—yet—know
how to anticipate their anticipation. This will make it hard to contest their inferences,
except in an entirely intuitive manner. We lose the ability to consciously reflect on
how we are being profiled and this will rule out contestation based on deliberation.
The second defence concerns our negative freedom, our ability to ‘unplug’ from
social intercourse. This seems directly related to the idea of informational privacy.
As Floridi (2005) has noted the right to informational privacy is often justified as a
proto-ethical value that enables the realization of other ethical values (reducing
privacy to a condition for other values, such as freedom, autonomy or fairness) or as
a relation of ownership (whereby a person owns her personal data). Tavani (2008)
has responded with the observation that most privacy theories actually fall within the
category of either control theories or restricted access theories, arguing that a
combination of both aspects would provide a more comprehensive theory of privacy.
I refer to Solove (2002); Cohen (2000); Nissenbaum (2010) for more fuzzy (and
therefore more precise?) conceptions. However, they all worry about control over or
access to personal data, and more precisely they are all concerned with personal
identifiability. The challenge we face is how to ‘unplug’ from being ‘read’, which is
a much more extensive and a very different attack on our privacy. The point,
moreover, is not merely that we must re-think privacy as the right not to be read all
the time by an infrastructure capable of disseminating these ‘readings’ way beyond
our circle of trust. The point is that we need an infrastructure that affords us a
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measure of control over who can read us, without putting the burden of protection
entirely on the shoulders of individual ‘users’.
To summarize, we need to design the upcoming proactive infosphere in a way that
allows us to anticipate how we are being categorized, while at the same time also
giving us space to be ‘unread’. This would constitute a re-ontologization of privacy,
rather than a mere re-thinking of privacy.
4.2 Ontological Friction in the Infosphere: Who Is Transparent for Whom?
Floridi (2005: 186–87) has developed the notion of privacy as a function of ‘the
ontological friction in the infosphere’:
The ontological features of the infosphere determine a specific degree of
‘ontological friction’ regulating the information flow within the system.
‘Ontological friction’ refers here to the forces that oppose the information flow
within (a region of) the infosphere, and hence (as a coefficient) to the amount of
work required for a certain kind of agent to obtain information (also, but not only)
about other agents in a given environment, e.g. by establishing and maintaining
channels of communication and by overcoming obstacles in the flow of
information such as distance, noise, lack of resources (especially time and
memory), amount and complexity of the data to be processed etc. Of course, the
informational affordances and constraints provided by an environment are such
only in relation to agents with specific informational capacities.
This notion is pivotal for an adequate understanding of privacy, because it does
not start from individual users that control ‘their’ information, but from an
infosphere that has as an affordance a measure of opacity of individual citizens.
Floridi (2005: 190) is quite optimistic about how the novel infosphere affects this
affordance:
It [re-ontologized infosphere, mh] has led not only to a huge expansion in the
flow of personal information being recorded, processed and exploited, but also
to a large increase in the types and levels of control that agents can exercise on
their personal data.(…): At their point of generation, digital ICTs can foster the
protection of personal data, e.g. by means of encryption, anonymization,
password-encoding, firewalling, specifically devised protocols or services, and,
in the case of externally captured data, warning systems. At their point of
storage, legislation, such as the Data Protection Directive passed by the EU in
1995, guarantees that no ontological friction, already removed by digital ICTs,
is surreptitiously reintroduced to prevent agents from coming to know about
the existence of personal data records, and from accessing them, checking their
accuracy, correcting or upgrading them or demanding their erasure. And at
their point of exploitation—especially through data-mining, -sharing, -matching
and -merging—digital ICTs could help agents to control and regulate the
usage of their data by facilitating the identification and regulation of the
relevant users involved.
In everyday practice, however, the Directive seems impotent to deliver the
substance of the access and control rights it has attributed in the form of written law.
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Our personal data proliferate and we have absolutely no clue as to which cloud is
holding them or who is inspecting them for reasons of either profit or security
(Koops and Leenes 2005). This might not be much of a problem to the extent that
their proliferation easily turns these data into noise, re-establishing the
ontological friction that constitutes privacy. However, the KDD technologies
described above have the power to turn data into the currency they now present,
creating an entirely new type of transparency and introducing an entirely
different ontological friction. The transparency regards an invisible visibility.
Whereas we cannot see how we are being profiled due to the proprietary regime
on data mining and databases (creating a novel ontological friction), the data
controllers who initiated these techniques have the means to make us visible as
correlated humans (creating novel information entities that represent us as e.g.
potential customers, terrorists, credit risks, healthcare consumers). The point is
that in a constitutional democracy citizens should be shielded with a default of
opacity, whereas those in authority should operate from a default of transparency
(Gutwirth and De Hert 2008). The present re-ontologization of the infosphere has
the opposite effect. So, while Floridi’s concept of ontological friction in the
infosphere is a rich analytic tool to observe changes in the affordances of the
infosphere, its application should take into account that privacy is no longer about
personal data but about statistiscally inferred pre-emptive personal profiles.
Floridi (2005: 194) provides a second analytical tool to discuss privacy in the re-
ontologized infosphere. He advocates a re-interpretation of privacy:
Such re-interpretation is achieved by considering each person as constituted by
his or her information, and hence by understanding a breach of one’s
informational privacy as a form of aggression towards one’s personal identity.
Though he then links the notion of privacy with the notion of personal identity in
a way that is problematic for many reasons (arguing in favour of biometric
identification, at 197–8, but see e.g. Rouvroy (2007)), the link between
informational privacy and personal identity is important (Hildebrandt 2006). Agre
and Rotenberg (2001: 7) have defined the right to privacy as:
The freedom from unreasonable constraints on the construction of one’s
identity.
This is interesting for six reasons. First, this definition acknowledges that identity
is not given, but the ephemeral result of a dynamic process. Second, it confirms
negative freedom (freedom from) as the core of privacy, while—third—not every
constraint is seen as a violation but only unreasonable constraints. Fourth, the
constraints concern positive freedom (freedom to), thus providing a broader
perspective to the concept of freedom instead of reducing it to the freedom to act
arbitrarily. Fifth, the definition links privacy with the development of one’s identity,
while—sixth—understanding identity as inherently relational. This highlights the
importance of context: who we are is co-determined by the context we engage with.
If the context takes away the possibility to foresee how we are being anticipated, the
freedom to develop our identity is at stake.
Returning to Floridi’s proposition that a person is constituted by her information, I
would fine-tune (or overturn?) this conception by arguing that a person is constituted
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by her anticipation of what information people have on her and how this will impact
their ‘reading’ of her. Though I am definitely constituted by my genes and by the
information processes they coordinate at the level of the cell, I am not necessarily
constituted by information about my genes. Note that without this information I am
still constituted by my genes. I may, however, be constituted by information about
my genes to the extent that this influences my sense of self, or my expectation of
how others define me (e.g. my partner, or my insurance company). This explains
why flows of information, rather than information by itself, co-constitute my
identity. This also explains why the state of being ‘unplugged’ from social
interaction (stopping, obfuscating, or filtering the flow of information) is
necessary to reset one’s boundaries (Altman 1975), to recoup one’s internal
coherence in the face of conflicting ‘readings’ by different persons or organiza-
tions, and also to reconstitute the self beyond the triggers of the environment. This
refers to the way Floridi defines the autonomy of an agent: being ‘able to change
state without direct response to interaction’ (Floridi and Sanders 2004: 9). Though
his concept of agency refers to agency at the highest level of abstraction, meaning
that it is not specific for human autonomy, we can confirm that at the level of
human agency the abilities to interact and adapt must be coupled with the ability to
reset oneself. The positionality of double contingency, typical for agents interacting
and adapting beyond the Umwelt in a Welt, requires a measure of ‘unreadability’ to
achieve autonomy. As in the case of all informational entities, both the construction
and the maintenance of complexity require a sustained effort. Autonomy cannot be
taken for granted.
5 A Legal Obligation for ISPs to Sustain Ontological Friction
5.1 Defining ISPs
Having traced some of the crucial epistemological and ethical implications of big
number crunching, we must now investigate the role of ISPs as providers of Big
Data and, thus, as enablers of extensive and detailed profiling. In this section, I will
clarify what is meant with ISPs; in the next, I will investigate to what extent the
present legal framework enables number crunching; and finally, I will discuss how
the duty to pre-empt profiling is derived. This will allow me to conclude about the
necessity to impose a legal obligation on ISPs that reinstates the ontological friction
that is constitutive of constitutional democracy.
ISPs have been defined as (Perset 2009: 11):
Internet access providers, which provide subscribers with a data connection
allowing access to the Internet through physical transport infrastructure.
They form a part of the larger group of ‘Internet intermediaries’ that function ‘(1)
to provide infrastructure; (2) to collect, organise and evaluate dispersed information;
(3) to facilitate social communication and information exchange; (4) to aggregate
supply and demand; (5) to facilitate market processes; (6) to provide trust; and (7) to
take into account the needs of both buyers/users and sellers/advertisers’ (Perset
2009: 6). Apart from internet access providers, examples of such intermediaries are
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data processing and web hosting providers, search engines, portals, internet
advertising networks, certification authorities, cloud computing platforms, internet
payment networks and participative networked platforms such as Wikipedia, virtual
worlds, social networking sites and more (Perset 2009: 7).
Though the difference between content and access providers may not always be
obvious, I will focus on access providers that provide what has been called ‘mere
conduit’. Practically speaking, this means broadband service providers (Yemini
2008). It implies that I will focus on the so-called ‘common carrier’ function of ISPs
that highlights their role as preconditional for the functioning of a host of other
applications. Providers of virtual worlds, wikis or social networking sites provide a
structured and often proprietary framework for users to publish and co-create
content, which depends on internet access. Their role extends far beyond the
physical infrastructure that allows users to connect and communicate. For this
reason, the consequences of their behaviour are different, entailing a different type of
responsibility. Cloud computer platforms, however, may come close to ISPs in
providing physical infrastructure for online activities. To the extent that software
applications, audio and video will move from personal computers to the cloud
(software as service and web streaming) we may need to involve them in our account
of ISPs and the ethics of number crunching. As some authors (e.g. Carr 2008) have
noted, this move will radicalize computing, data mining and the control of the web.
It will influence, reinvent or even terminate net neutrality, requiring serious analysis
in line with that of the responsibility of ISPs.
Within the context of this article, I understand ISPs as information entities, as
agents and as moral agents, building on Floridi’s framework of Information
Ethics (Floridi and Sanders 2004). Since I advocate not merely an ethical but also
a legal obligation to maintain technical obstructions against systematic monitoring
of content, it is important to note that ISPs are legal subjects in most—if not all—
jurisdictions. They can in fact be held accountable in a court of law. Indeed, law
preceded the discussion of agency for nonhuman entities, notably for corporations,
funds and even ships, by taking a pragmatic view of legal personhood for non-
natural persons (Wells 2001; French 1979). To the extent that these entities should
be able to act in law (e.g. to contract) or should be held accountable for harm
caused (e.g. in the case of tort or crime) positive law has attributed legal
personhood to a variety of non-natural persons, thereby allowing second and third
parties as well as victims to sue such an entity in a court of law. As Dewey (1926)
has noted the attribution of legal personhood is artificial, but not imaginary, just
like an artificial lake is not an imaginary lake. Once again paraphrasing Merton
(1948), we can state: ‘if the law defines a situation as real, it is real in its (legal)
consequences’.
5.2 ISPs Monitoring of Traffic Data and Content
I will now discuss existing and emerging incentives for ISPs to monitor the data
packets they transport. This is important because once they get involved in
systematic monitoring they can provide interested parties with Big Data to an
extent that might even dwarf Google’s databases. At the moment of writing this
article, one of the major Dutch ISPs, KPN, has announced that it is already using
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Deep Packing Inspection to determine the Internet data traffic of its customers.1 It
claims to use this to check whether customers are using instant messaging or
applications, in order to charge them for using applications like, for instance, Skype.
This could jeopardize net neutrality, but in the end it will also enable extensive
monitoring of the content of internet traffic.
Let me begin with a citation from a striking argument for net neutrality, based on
the individual right to freedom of expression that has been put forward by Yemini
(2008: 15):
In order to ‘reach’ the logical and content layers, one has to ‘pass through’ the
physical layer; whoever controls the physical layer, unless restricted by law,
becomes a gatekeeper for all other layers; and scarcity of physical layers means
more control, and ability to realize that control, for fewer gatekeepers.
It should be obvious that the capacity of ISPs to track and trace our online
behaviour is unprecedented. At this moment, a major amount of tracking is already
taking place, first and foremost in order to provide good service to clients and to
protect them from security risks. This involves monitoring to detect malware, to
prevent spam and to manage bandwidth. Second, the Data Retention Directive 2006/
24/EC requires monitoring and logging of traffic data as a means to improve law
enforcement. Third, some ISPs may inspect data packets in order to detect IP
infringements or illegal content,2 though this is controversial and will easily violate
privacy as well as data protection legislation if not warranted by law.
As Ohm (2009) explains, it is only recently the case that ISPs have the technical
means to actually inspect the greater part of the content that passes on their network.
In an even more vehement argument than that of Yemini, he proposes an alignment
of privacy and net-neutrality arguments. Ohm (2009: 1420) declares somewhat
dramatically:
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) have the power to obliterate privacy online.
Everything we say, hear, read, or do on the Internet first passes through ISP
computers. If ISPs wanted, they could store it all, compiling a perfect transcript
of our online lives. In fact, nothing in society poses as grave a threat to privacy
as the ISP, not even Google, a company whose privacy practices have received
an inordinate amount of criticism and commentary. Although Google collects a
vast amount of personal information about its users, an ISP can always access
even more because it owns and operates a privileged net-work bottleneck, the
only point on the network that sits between a user and the rest of the Internet.
Because of this fact about network design, a user cannot say anything to
Google without saying it first to his ISP, and an ISP can also hear everything a
user says to any other websites like Facebook or eBay, things said that are
unobtainable to Google. The potential threat to privacy from unchecked ISP
surveillance surpasses every other threat online.
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1 See http://english.capital.gr/News.asp?id=1194719 (last visited 14th May 2011).
2 See for instance, DtecNet (at http://dtecnet.com/), which sells software solutions to ISPs that provide
‘unique filtering solutions specifically targeting copyrighted content. With real-time traffic monitoring, the
system allows ISPs to drastically reduce network congestion caused by distribtion of illegal content on
P2P protocols’.
There are various reasons why ISPs will be induced or even enforced to monitor
the data packets they have under their care to a much further extent than at the
present moment. The main incentives emerge in the context of business models and
forensic investigations. In the case of business models we may expect that profits
can be made by having clients pay for greater speed or special access to particular
sites in case of congestion; this could easily violate net-neutrality (equal access to the
internet for all). Also, ISPs could get involved with targeted advertising based on
Web-surf behaviour, which could further erode the privacy of their clients. In many
ways, ISPs would have access to far more data than even Google does, and we
should have no doubt about the extent to which Google could ‘read us’ (Conti
2009). In the case of forensic investigation, the transnational struggle against child
pornography, human trafficking, terrorism and anti-money laundering will continue to
feed the agenda for more access to more behavioural data. As mentioned above, the
Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC requires Member States to impose a duty on
providers of electronic communications to retain traffic data for not less than 6 months
and for not more than 2 years. Though it does forbid Member States to base any
obligation to retain the content of a communication on the Directive, traffic data easily
contain many indications of content (e.g. in the subject header of an email) posing a
much bigger threat for privacy than for instance the traffic data of telephone calls.
Another incentive that may warrant more intrusive monitoring derives from the ease
with which Internet users can post all kinds of incorrect, sloppy, slanderous or otherwise
irresponsible information. One could say that, worse than mere noise, such
‘information’ is not even meant to be truthful, coherent or respectful. From the
perspective of Information Ethics, such ‘information’ could actually increase entropy
and disrupt carefully constructed domains of knowledge, by disseminating incorrect
rumours about whatever anybody likes to engage with. Hate speech or quasi-concerned
comments that evoke hatred against pedophiles, Muslims or Christians as a group, or
against specific politicians, journalists or other individuals can have far-reaching
consequences for a person’s reputation, capability to find work, insure herself or
engage in public debate. Referring to Sunstein (2009), Fish (2011) notes that:
Rather then producing truth, the free and open marketplace of the Internet ‘will
lead many people to accept damaging and destructive falsehoods,’ and unless
there is ‘some kind of chilling effect on false statements,’ the ‘proper
functioning of democracy itself’ may be endangered.
This has led to a call to hold ISPs accountable for the harm caused by the content
they disseminate (Levmore and Nussbaum 2011; Fish 2011). This is an intelligible
reflex, but the ensuing obligation for ISPs to monitor the data they ‘carry’ is very
problematic. The European legislator seems to have been aware of this. Under the
heading of ‘No general obligation to monitor’ art. 15 of the eCommerce Directive
2000/31 EC stipulated that
1. Member States shall not impose a general obligation on providers, when
providing the services covered by Articles 12 [mere conduit, mh], 13 [caching,
mh] and 14 [hosting, mh], to monitor the information which they transmit or
store, nor a general obligation actively to seek facts or circumstances indicating
illegal activity.
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2. Member States may establish obligations for information society service
providers promptly to inform the competent public authorities of alleged illegal
activities undertaken or information provided by recipients of their service or
obligations to communicate to the competent authorities, at their request,
information enabling the identification of recipients of their service with whom
they have storage agreements.
Though the need to fight hate speech, dangerous or incorrect information,
child pornography and international terrorism may benefit from a duty to remove
content that causes moral harm (conform also recital 48 of the same Directive
that requires Member States to apply duties of care to detect and prevent certain
types of illegal activities), good arguments can be given to couple this duty with
a complementary obligation that requires ISPs to prevent systematic deep packet
inspection. Removing content should then always be based on incidental deep
packet inspection, conditional on specific charges of illegal content. As we have
seen the Data Retention Directive that was enacted 6 years after the eCommerce
Directive already overrules Art. 15 by imposing a general obligation to not only
monitor but to actually retain traffic data. Even if ISPs do not—yet—use or sell
these data for data mining, they are now forced to build an infrastructure that
makes them available at the request of the competent national authority (which is
not necessarily a judge). And though the Data Retention Directive stipulates that
the retained data may only be provided in specific cases and in accordance with the
necessity and proportionality requirements of e.g. the European Convention of
Human Rights, the mere fact that such data are somehow kept in store for further
inspection should worry us. Especially considering the kind of knowledge that can
be inferred from this data, it becomes ever more important to stave off further
obligations to retain data. In point of fact, we should reconsider to what extent this
obligation must be mitigated or withdrawn. The judgements of the Constitutional
Courts of various Member States provide ample indications of the highly
problematic nature of these measures from the perspective of a substantive
conception of the Rule of Law (De Vries et al. 2011 forthcoming). Considering the
extent to which citizens could be ‘readable’ as a consequence of inferences drawn
from the Big Data held by ISPs we need to consider imposing a legal duty to
pre-empt systematic monitoring.
5.3 ISPs in a Constitutional Democracy
Having substantiated the preconditional role played by ISPs as enablers of a new
type of transparency that will reduce the ontological friction that provides us with
privacy, I will now clarify how the obligation to pre-empt this is derived.
In moral theory the repertoire for ethical duties is often reduced to two types of
justification: deontological theories based on Kantian notions of human autonomy
(which is assumed as given for a transcendental subject) (Rawls 2005) and utilitarian
theories based on calculations of cost and benefit (differentiating between e.g. rule
and act utilitarianism (Edmundson 2004), or plain and average utilitarianism (Rawls
2005)). A third way to understand ethical action has been located in virtue ethics,
which focuses on the development of character and personality as an anchor for
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practical wisdom. I would like to opt-out of this restricted framework and opt-into an
ethics inspired on the work of pragmatists such as e.g. Peirce, Dewey, Holmes, G.H.
Mead, Toulmin and Haack. Though both utilitarianism and pragmatism are
consequentialist theories, they differ greatly in terms of their level of analysis. The
pragmatist maxim looks at the meaning of words in terms of the consequences of
their usage, coming close to Wittgenstein’s understanding of language (Taylor 1995).
Deontological, utilitarian as well as virtue ethics all build on some form of
methodological individualism.
In the case of ISPs’ monitoring capacities, such a restricted ethics will not do.
The impact of the re-ontologization of the infosphere on societal checks and
balances is not merely a matter of enlarging or reducing the scope of human
autonomy. Its impact concerns asymmetries in access to and understanding of
data, information, knowledge and meaning. This requires an ethics that takes into
account the consequences for the polity, for civil society, for distributive justice,
reciprocal power relationships and e.g. the state’s capacity to legislate and
provide the legal certainty that allows individual citizens to act as relatively
autonomous agents. As argued in the preceding section, ISPs constitute the
enabling information and communication infrastructure of our societies. They
form the bottom line of a host of other applications that are turning into the
critical infrastructure of everyday life. To some extent they build on, partner with,
replace and transform the information and communication infrastructure of the
printing press. Having different affordances they will induce different behaviour
patterns, and according to some authors even different perception and different
cognition (Carr 2010; Tapscott 2009). This will affect the constitution of authors
and actors as well as the polity they constitute. From the perspective of democratic
theory and the rule of law, this implies that the duties resting on ISPs cannot be
based on their individual ethical virtue, categorical duties or calculations of cost
and benefits. Rather, these duties derive from the framework of constitutional
democracy, i.e. the historical artefact that sustains the tension between the
institution of self-rule and the constraints imposed on democratic majorities by
the protection of human rights and constitutional arrangements that produce the
autonomy they aim to protect. The argument is based on a substantive conception
of the Rule of Law (or the ‘Rechtsstaat’), which defines the Rule of Law in terms
of an effective commitment to human rights and the separation of powers. This
substantive conception provides legal protection not afforded by the formal
conception, which merely checks whether the government has adhered to certain
procedural standards when governing, legislating and adjudicating (Grote 1999;
Koetter 2010). A substantive conception of the Rule of Law can, thus, prevent
democracy from turning into the tyranny of majority rule, as it will safeguard the
liberties of individual citizens and their rights to dissent and to develop new
majorities.
Precisely because ISPs provide the novel ICT infrastructure of current
democracies we cannot be indifferent to the way this infrastructure is designed.
Their role as scaffolding of a viable constitutional democracy actually demands that
they do not merely refrain from monitoring their data packets, but actually build in
the legal protection against such monitoring at the level of the technical
infrastructure.
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6 Conclusions: Who Needs Stories if You Can Get the Data?
In this contribution, I have focused on how ISPs may violate the identity of
individual human agents by obstructing their ablity to anticipate how they are being
read and their ability to shield themselves from being ‘read’ by their smart
environment. My argument builds on the assumption that in a constitutional
democracy, privacy requires a default of transparency of data miners and a default of
opacity of individual persons.
In his provocative article in Wired Magazine, Anderson (2008) claimed that data
mining will ultimately refute theory. We could paraphrase him by saying: who needs
theory if you can get the data? Similarly, we may assume that statistical inferences
could one day refute the stories a person tells to give an account of herself. At some
point the police, the judge, the insurance agent, your webshop, Google Analytics,
your doctor and your tax collector will point out that you match an aggregated
profile that probably (sic!) provides a better prediction of your future behaviour than
whatever you tell them. In this contribution I have argued that this is not science
fiction nor unavoidable. Information and communication infrastructures do not entirely
determine our interaction, though they often determine the bandwidth. Though we
invent them, they in turn invent us. Insofar as we begin to notice how different ICT
designs have different implications, constitutional democracy requires to design them in
a way that protects individual persons against statistical determinations they cannot
foresee. This requires us to build in the necessary ontological frictions to guarantee a
measure of opacity for citizens and to remove the ontological frictions that prevent us
from anticipating how we are anticipated. This duty cannot be put on the shoulders of
individual ISPs that must survive in an incentive structure that forces their hand to
monitor our web behaviours. Such a duty must be decided upon within the framework
of democratic participation and constitutional constraints, safeguarding a level playing
field tuned to the novelties of a computational infosphere.
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